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This paper formulates equilibrium concepts in the large (nonatomic) household
model under the team notion, characterizes a class of equilibrium allocations, ex-
plores whether an equilibrium allocation in the large-household model is a limit
of equilibrium allocations in the ﬁnite-household model, and establishes exis-
tence of equilibrium allocations generated by generalized Nash bargaining.
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1. Introduction
Search models play a dominant role in labor economics and a prominent role in mon-
etary economics. In such models, meeting-speciﬁc shocks are obvious sources of het-
erogeneity in wealth. Because such heterogeneity precludes closed-form solutions, ef-
fortshavebeenmadetocreatemodelsinwhichequilibriahavedegeneratedistributions
of wealth. One such model is the so-called large-household model initiated by Merz
(1995)inlaboreconomicsandbyShi(1997)inmonetaryeconomics. Inthismodel,each
household consists of a nonatomic measure of agents and each agent from a household
meets someone from outside the household—a ﬁrm in Merz (1995) and an agent from
another household in Shi (1997). If all households start with the same wealth, then it
is feasible for all households to experience the same distribution of meeting outcomes,
and, byalawoflargenumbersargument, toendupwiththesamewealth. Butfeasibility
should not be confused with equilibrium.
There are two conceivable interpretations of the multi-member household in this
literature. A household can be viewed as a team in the sense of Marschak and Radner
(1972): each member is a decision maker, but all share the same objective function. Al-
ternatively, a household can be viewed as a programmer and the members as automata:
the programmer, the unique decision maker, chooses what the members do in pair-
wise meetings. With the team notion, we can maintain, as in the standard single-agent
household, subgame perfection of the pairwise split-the-surplus game. Indeed, we can
adopt an off-the-shelf equilibrium concept to provide a uniﬁed treatment—one that
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applies independent of the size of the household and one that makes the single-agent
householdaspecialcase. Incontrast, withtheautomatanotion, Nashequilibriumisthe
onlysolutionconceptforthesplit-the-surplusgame.1 Theresultisahugemultiplicityof
equilibria. (Think about two players in an ultimatum game played through automata.)2
Without doubt, the team notion is superior. Although not made explicit, it seems
to be used in the initial papers (Merz 1995, Shi 1997). Those papers, however, do not
correctly deﬁne an equilibrium. In particular, they do not correctly describe meeting
outcomes obtained by agents of an off-equilibrium household, one whose wealth is not
average wealth. In Merz (1995) and Shi (1997), each agent of such a household is as-
sumed to obtain the same outcome as an agent of an in-equilibrium household. But
in a money model this is obviously problematic because an off-equilibrium buyer may
be too poor to afford the assumed outcome. Rauch (2000), in a lengthy comment on Shi
(1997),pointedouttherelevanceofthehousehold’swealth,buthissuggestedcorrection
is incomplete. He misses the following loop. The end-of-meeting wealth of the house-
hold depends on the distribution of meeting outcomes obtained by its agents. For each
agent of the household, the meeting outcome depends on the agent’s evaluation of each
feasible outcome in the meeting. That evaluation, in turn, depends on the household’s
end-of-meeting wealth, which the agent takes as given (because the household is large).
This loop constitutes a mapping: the household’s pre-meeting wealth is a parameter of
the mapping and the end-of-meeting wealth is a ﬁxed point (if one exists).
In this paper, I focus on the team notion in the context of a money model. In Sec-
tion 2, I set up the model so that feasibility of degeneracy holds for any size house-
hold with the same number (or measure) of buyers and sellers. In particular, search
is directed—a buyer always meets a seller. This setup permits me to treat large as a limit
of ﬁnite. Then, in Section 3, I deﬁne equilibrium and give a reﬁnement: no defection
by the household as a whole, which I call team optimality. In Section 4, I characterize a
classofequilibriumallocations. InSection5,Iusean-equilibriumapproachtoexplore
the sense in which an equilibrium allocation in the large-household setting is a limit of
equilibrium allocations in the ﬁnite-household setting. In Section 6, I prove existence
of equilibrium allocations generated by generalized Nash bargaining. A more detailed
discussion of the problems in the literature is given in Section 7.
Themostimportantexistenceresultisforequilibriuminthelarge-householdmodel
under the team optimality reﬁnement (Proposition 4). I do not develop a general ﬁxed-
point proof, which, because of the loop described above, would involve two layers of
ﬁxed points. My proof is constructive. The basic idea is to let any off-equilibrium
buyer/seller spend/acquire as much as possible, so any off-equilibrium household after
search has average wealth. If the derivative of the household’s value function at the av-
erage wealth is deﬁned, then all agents in present meetings, in and off equilibrium, have
1See Abreu and Rubinstein (1988, p. 1265) for a discussion of the solution concept in the context of
repeated games.
2The origin of the household construct can be traced back to Lucas (1980, 1990). The setup in Lucas
(1990) is exactly designed to obtain the representative household. Lucas does not give an explicit interpre-
tation of the household. In the Walrasian models he studies, the above two notions turn out to give the
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the same linear payoff function of money with coefﬁcient equal to the discounted value
of that derivative. As a result, I can solve for that derivative from an equation that does
not depend on the value function. Then I can use the derivative to construct the value
function. (In this construction, the linear function of money implied by large plays the
exact role of the linear function of money implied by quasi-linearity in the single-agent
household model of Lagos and Wright 2005.) The in-equilibrium trade of this equilib-
rium is the one that appears in some of the literature. In that sense, my formulation
justiﬁes that part of the literature.
More recent papers (e.g., Shi 1999, Head and Shi 2003, and Wang and Shi 2006)
seem to use the automata notion. With this notion, there are many equilibria (see Ap-
pendix B), a problem those papers fail to recognize. A basic message to users of the
large-household model is that a choice has to be made. With the automata notion, ex-
istence is easy but multiplicity is a problem. With the team notion, existence may be
challenging. My constructive proof does not seem general enough to apply to all exist-
ing versions of the large-household model.
2. The physical environment
Time is discrete. There is a nonatomic measure of inﬁnitely lived households. All
households are ex ante identical. Each household is identiﬁed with a probability space
(I,I,): there are a set of buyers and a set of sellers in the household, both indexed by
I. The set I is either ﬁnite with n elements or uncountably inﬁnite. If the former, then 
is uniform over I and the household is referred to as a ﬁnite household; if the latter, then
 is nonatomic and the household is referred to as a large household.3
There is one produced and perishable good per date. At each date, agents from dif-
ferent households are matched in pairs; matching is random, but a buyer always meets
a seller.4 In each meeting, the buyer can consume but not produce the good; the seller
can produce but not consume the good; and the good produced must be consumed by











b is the consumption of buyer i from the household, andqi
s is the production of
seller i from the household. Each agent as an independent decision-maker (or player)
maximizes expected discounted utility with discount factor  2 (0,1). As is standard, u
3Ahouseholdwithn buyersandn sellerscanbeviewedasthen-foldreplicaofahouseholdwith1buyer
and 1 seller; a large household can be viewed as the limit of a ﬁnite household as n !1. This is analogous
to treating a large economy as the limit of a sequence of replica economies (see Hildenbrand 1974, Ch. 2).
4Search is not directed in Rauch (2000) and Shi (1997) so the household must be large to make degener-
acy feasible.
5Inspired by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), Rauch (2000) and Shi (1997) consider multiple types of goods
and households. In this setting, one can further assume that buyers pool goods together after search. It is
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is bounded, u 0 > 0, u 00 < 0, u(0) = 0, and u 0(0) = 1; it is without loss of generality to set
c(q)=q.
There is another durable, divisible, and intrinsically useless object called money.
The stock of money is constant. Each household starts at date 0 with one unit of money.
There is an upper bound M > 1 on the household’s money holdings. Some results
(Propositions 3 and 4) assume a ﬁnite M. When that is the case, M is nonbinding in
the sense given below.
In each pairwise meeting, agents may exchanges the good for money. The trading
outcome is described below. Agents from a household are anonymous to agents from
other households, so each agent’s trading history is unknown to agents of other house-
holds (but known to agents of the same household). Agents from the same household
cannot communicate in pairwise meetings.
Twomoreassumptionsaboutthephysicalenvironmentaremade. First,withineach
household, any money held is evenly redistributed among its buyers at the start of each
date. (Note that sellers hold zero.) This assumption is explicitly made in Rauch (2000)
and Shi (1997). Here it permits me to simplify the individual agent’s state space (see
footnote 6). Second, in each meeting, one agent’s money holding and his household’s
pre-meeting money holding are common knowledge to the relevant pair. This assump-
tion is consistent with the treatment in Rauch (2000) and Shi (1997). Here it permits me
to avoid dealing with asymmetric information.
3. Allocation, trading mechanism, and equilibrium
My ﬁrst goal is to examine the conditions under which an allocation can be an equi-
librium allocation under some trading mechanism. An allocation prescribes a trade for
each pairwise meeting conditional on certain factors. A trading mechanism speciﬁes for
each pairwise meeting sets of actions for agents and a mapping from actions to trading
outcomes. The matching process and the trading mechanism imply a game so one can
deﬁne equilibrium. An allocation is an equilibrium allocation if its prescribed trades
coincide with the trades implied by some equilibrium strategy proﬁle.
I focus on stationary allocations, which prescribe the trade of a meeting conditional
onlyonthestatesofthepairinthemeeting. Anagentissaidtobeinstatem ifhishouse-
hold’s pre-meeting money holding is m. A generic pairwise trade is denoted by (q,l); q
is the transfer of the good (from a seller to a buyer), l n 1 is the transfer of money (from
a buyer to a seller) when the household is ﬁnite, and l is the transfer of money when the
household is large. Therefore, an allocation A is a pair of real-valued functions (q(.),l (.))
on [0,M]2, where (q(mb,ms),l (mb,ms)) is the prescribed trade between a buyer in state
mb and a seller in state ms. (It is important to remember the following convention: q
and l are scalars; q(.) and l(.) are functions over [0,M]2; and q(mb,ms) and l(mb,ms)
are evaluations of q(.) and l(.) at (mb,ms).)
While allocations need not be those generated by surplus-splitting rules standard
in the literature (Nash bargaining, the ultimatum game, price taking, etc.), they satisfy
two properties that allocations generated by those rules satisfy. Speciﬁcally, if an alloca-
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pairwise trade, in equilibrium or off equilibrium, satisﬁes sequential individual ratio-
nality (SIR)—the trade weakly dominates autarky for each agent, and pairwise efﬁciency
(PE)—the trade is on the pairwise Pareto frontier.
Given A = (q(.),l(.)), I study a two-stage trading mechanism, denoted T A. When a
buyer in state mbmeets a seller in state ms, T A describes the following two stages of
actions.
Stage 1 First the buyer announces a number in f0,1g and then the seller announces a
number in f0,1g. If both announce 1, then they move to stage 2; otherwise, the
trade is (0,0) and the meeting is over. (This stage is for SIR.)
Stage 2 First the buyer proposes a trade (q,l) and then the seller announces a number
in f0,1g. If 1 is announced, then (q,l ) is carried out and the meeting is over; oth-
erwise (q(mb,ms),l (mb,ms)), the trade prescribed by A, is carried out and the
meeting is over. (This stage is for PE.)
Throughout, I assume that each agent in each stage, when indifferent between say-
ing 1 and 0, says 1.
In the implied game, I restrict attention to equilibria such that each agent does not
condition his actions on calendar time or his private information about past meetings
that he and the members of the same household experience. Denote by fb = (fb1, fb2)
a buyer’s strategy and by fs = (fs1, fs2) a seller’s strategy in such an equilibrium, where
the subscript 1 denotes a stage-1 action and the subscript 2 a stage-2 action. Then ef-
fectively fb and fs can be expressed as the following mappings:
fb1 :[0,M]2 !f0,1g, fb2 :[0,M]2 !R2
+ (1)
fs1 :[0,M]2 f0,1g!f0,1g, fs2 :[0,M]2 R2
+ !f0,1g. (2)
(When the buyer in state mb meets the seller in state ms, fb1(mb,ms) is the buyer’s
stage-1 announcement; fs1(mb,ms,n) is the seller’s stage-1 announcement follow-
ing the buyer’s announcement n; fb2(mb,ms) is the buyer’s stage-2 proposal; and
fs2(mb,ms,q,l) is the seller’s stage-2 announcement following the proposal (q,l).6)
Moreover, I restrict attention to symmetric equilibria (i.e., ones in which all buy-
ers/sellers from all households choose the same fb/fs).
Definition 1. GiventhetradingmechanismT A,anequilibriumisastrategyproﬁlerep-
resented by f =(fb, fs) (see (1) and (2)) such that it is optimal for one agent to follow the
actions indicated by f currently and in the future, provided that all other agents, includ-
ing those from the same household, follow the actions indicated by f .
Remark 1. By design, if A is an equilibrium allocation under T A then it satisﬁes SIR and
PE. There is a class of mechanisms with such a property. An arbitrary mechanism in
6In the absence of the special money-redistribution assumption, the individual agent’s state is a prob-
ability distribution describing how money is distributed among the household members, and so the do-
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the class, denoted T, consists of three stages in each meeting. Stage 0 of T may consist
of many substages, and each sequence of actions in stage 0 leads to a proposed trade
(q0,l0). Stage 1 of T is exactly stage 1 of T A. In stage 2 of T, with pre-determined prob-
ability p 2 f0,1g the buyer proposes a new trade and the seller announces a number
in f0,1g; with probability 1 p the seller proposes a trade and the buyer makes an an-
nouncement. If the newly-proposed trade is followed by 1, then it is carried out; other-
wise (q0,l0), the trade proposed in stage 0, is carried out. (An ultimatum game is equiva-
lenttosuchaT inwhichoneagent’sactiondictatesthestage-0proposedtrade. Also,T A
is equivalent to such a T—by simply adding stage 0 in the obvious way.) We can make
the same tie-breaking assumption, and deﬁne equilibrium as above. Then by design,
if A is an equilibrium allocation under T, it satisﬁes SIR and PE. Also, it is not hard to
verify that if A is an equilibrium allocation under T then it is an equilibrium allocation
under T A. This justiﬁes the focus on T A.7
Giventheinitialdistributionofmoney,symmetryimpliesthatanyDeﬁnition-1equi-
libriumisdegenerate inthatallin-equilibriumhouseholdsholdoneunitofmoneyatthe
start of each date. From now on, I refer to a household with one unit of money as a reg-
ular household, an agent from a regular household as a regular agent, and a meeting
between two regular agents as a regular meeting.
Asisstandard,thenotionofequilibriumensuresindividualoptimality(i.e.,nobene-
ﬁcial unilateral deviation), but need not ensure team optimality (i.e., no beneﬁcial joint
deviation by the household as a whole). When members of the same household can
agree on a beneﬁcial joint deviation, there is no problem of implementation. While
thosemembersdonotcommunicateinsearch, iftheycommunicatebeforesearch, they
can make an agreement in advance. So I introduce a reﬁnement to rule out such devia-
tions.8 Because equilibrium is degenerate, I restrict joint deviations to those that occur
when meeting regular agents.
Definition 2. A Deﬁnition-1 equilibrium f is strong if agents from the same household
cannot improve by any joint deviation when meeting regular agents.
Remark 2. As is shown below (Propositions 5 and 6 (i)), in some equilibria there exist
such beneﬁcial joint deviations. If one has in mind that agents from the same house-
hold communicate before search, then strong equilibrium is the suitable equilibrium
notion. But if one has the opposite in mind, then non-strong equilibrium should not be
thrown out, and one may even view existence of non-strong equilibrium as an interest-
ing implication of the team model.
7This result resembles a result in Kocherlakota (1998), who studies a class of trading mechanisms that
ensure SIR. He shows that an equilibrium allocation under such a trading mechanism is an equilibrium
allocation under the direct trading mechanism associated with the allocation.
8The relationship between equilibrium and this reﬁnement is analogous to the relationship between
a person-by-person satisfactory team decision function and the best team decision function in Marschak
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Given an allocation A = (q(.),l(.)), by a trivial application of Blackwell’s sufﬁcient
conditions, there is a unique bounded function on [0,M] satisfying
v(m)=u(q(m,1)) q(1,m)+v(g(m)) with g(m)=m  l(m,1)+l(1,m). (3)
This function is called the value function associated with the allocation A because when
A is an equilibrium allocation, v is the value function on the household’s money hold-
ings. (In that equilibrium, if the household starts with m, then with probability one,
each of its buyers consumesq(m,1), each of its sellers producesq(1,m), and the house-
hold ends up with g(m).)
In what follows, I restrict attention to A = (q(.),l(.)) satisfying (C1) q(1,1) > 0 and
(C2) the associated value function v is nondecreasing, continuous, and concave. If A
is an equilibrium allocation, then by (C1) the equilibrium is monetary. Monotonicity
of v is equivalent to free disposal of money. In the large-household setting, I identify
the payoff to an individual agent from his own action in any pairwise meeting as the
marginal contribution to the agent’s objective function. (Because the measure of the
agent is inﬁnitesimal, so is the payoff. This treatment resembles the way that Aumann
and Shapley (1974) deﬁne the Shapley value of a nonatomic agent.) Given the concav-
ity and continuity of v, I can express the marginal contribution in terms of the left and
right derivatives of v (cf. Rockafellar 1970, p. 213, Theorem 23.1). As is usual in dynamic
models, these properties of A cannot be ensured in equilibrium by assumptions on the
primitives. In Section 4, I study conditions for an A with such properties to be an equi-
librium allocation; in Section 6, I show existence of equilibrium allocations with such
properties.
4. Characterization of equilibrium allocations
Fix an allocation A =(q(.),l (.)) satisfying (C1)–(C2) and suppose that it is an equilibrium
allocation under the trading mechanism T A. In order to describe the conditions that
ensure no deviation from trades prescribed by A, I ﬁrst describe how an agent in arbi-
trary state m evaluates a trade in a meeting, taking as given that all other agents from
the same household obtain the trades prescribed by A currently and that v in (3) is the
value function deﬁned on the household’s money holdings.
When the household is ﬁnite and the agent in state m is a buyer, with probability
one each of the n sellers from his household trades (q(1,m),l(1,m)), and each of the
other n  1 buyers from his household trades (q(m,1),l(m,1)). Therefore, if the agent
trades (0,0), then the value of his objective function is u(q(m,1))(1  n 1) q(1,m)+
v(g(m)+l(m,1)n 1) (the ﬁrst term is the contribution to the objective function from
the other buyers’ consumption, the second term is the contribution from the sellers’
production, and the last term is the contribution from the household’s end-of-meeting
money holding). It follows that the additional contribution to his objective function
from trading (q,l) is
B0(q,l,m)=u(q)n 1  [v(g(m)+l(m,1)n 1) v(g(m)+l(m,1)n 1  l n 1)], (4)264 Tao Zhu Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
and this contribution per unit of the buyer’s measure in the set I (which is n 1) is
B(q,l ,m)=u(q) n[v(g(m)+l (m,1)n 1) v(g(m)+l(m,1)n 1  l n 1)]. (5)
The analogous expression applies when the agent in state m is a seller. The household’s
end-of-meeting money holding is g(m) l(1,m)n 1 if the seller trades (0,0), so the ad-
ditional contribution to his objective function from (q,l) is
S0(q,l,m)= qn 1 +[v(g(m) l (1,m)n 1 +l n 1) v(g(m) l(1,m)n 1)], (6)
and this contribution per unit of his measure in I is
S(q,l ,m)= q +n[v(g(m) l(1,m)n 1 +l n 1) v(g(m) l(1,m)n 1)]. (7)
When the household is large, as indicated above I deﬁne the payoff from trading
(q,l) as the marginal contribution to the agent’s objective function. As n !1, the limit
of the additional contribution B(q,l,m) in (5) (respectivelyS(q,l,m) in (7)) deﬁnes the
marginal contribution when the agent in state m is a buyer (respectively seller). The
limit of B(q,l ,m) in (5), still denoted B(q,l ,m), is












 (z) is the left derivative and v0
+(z) is the right derivative of v at z.9
I have assumed that when M is ﬁnite it is nonbinding. Precisely, this means that
for any feasible transfer of money from a buyer in state mb 2 [0,M] to a seller in state
ms 2 [0,M], given all other agents follow the trades prescribed by A, the buyer’s and
seller’s households end the date with holdings less than M. That is, when the household
is ﬁnite, g(mb)+l(mb,1)n 1 < M and g(ms) l (1,ms)n 1 +mbn 1 < M;10 when the
household is large, g(mb) < M and g(ms) < M. With this assumption, I can apply the
payoffs in (4)–(9) with no restriction.
9Note that if v 0
 (g(m)) = v 0
+(g(m)), then we have wb(l ,m) = ws(l ,m) = l v 0(g(m)). To see (8),
write v(g(m)+l (m,1)n 1) v(g(m)+l (m,1)n 1  l n 1) as v(g(m)+l (m,1)n 1) v(g(m))+v(g(m)) 
v(g(m)+l (m,1)n 1  l n 1). A similar treatment leads to (9).
10If the buyer in state mb transfers all his holding mbn 1 to the seller in state ms, then the seller’s house-
holdendsupwith g(ms) l (1,ms)n 1+mbn 1. Ifthebuyertransferszero,thenthebuyer’shouseholdends
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Now consider the meeting between the buyer in state mb and the seller in state ms.
For A to be an equilibrium allocation under T A, SIR must hold; that is,
B(q(mb,ms),l(mb,ms),mb)0 (10)
S(q(mb,ms),l (mb,ms),ms)0 (11)




subject to 0l mb andS(q,l,ms)S(q(mb,ms),l (mb,ms),ms)
(otherwise the buyer can offer a trade in stage 2 leading to pairwise improvement). Let
the strategy proﬁle f A =(f A
b , f A





s1(mb,ms,n)=1 8n 2f0,1g, (14)
f A
s2(mb,ms,q,l)=1,[0l mb andS(q,l,ms)S(q(mb,ms),l(mb,ms),ms)]. (15)
If A satisﬁes (10)–(12) (i.e., (10)–(12) hold for all (mb,ms)), then by the one-stage-
deviation principle, f A is a Deﬁnition-1 equilibrium.
In the equilibrium f A, for a buyer in state m the set of admissible trades when meet-
ing a regular seller is
¯  b(m)=f(0,0)g[f(q,l ):0l m,S(q,l,1)S(q(m,1),l (m,1),1)g. (16)
(This buyer obtains either no trade (by saying 0 at stage 1), or any trade giving the seller
a payoff no less than the trade prescribed by A.) Also, in the equilibrium f A, for a seller
in state m the set of admissible trades when meeting a regular buyer is
¯
 s(m)=f(0,0)g[f(q(1,m),l(1,m))g. (17)
(This seller obtains either no trade or the trade prescribed by A.) Letting [K]I denote the
product set
Q
i2I Ki with Ki = K for all i, it follows that [¯  b(m)
¯
 s(m)]I is the set of
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It is clear that f A is strong if and only if for all m,
v(m)=maxW((m)) subject to (m)2[¯  b(m)
¯
 s(m)]I. (19)
To summarize, we have the following result.266 Tao Zhu Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Proposition 1. Let A be an allocation satisfying (C1) and (C2). When the household is
ﬁnite, let the additional payoff functions B and S be as given in (5) and (7); when the
household is large, let the marginal payoff functions B and S be as given in (8) and (9).
(i) f A (see (13)–(15)) is a Deﬁnition-1 equilibrium if and only if A satisﬁes (10)–(12).
(ii) f A is a Deﬁnition-2 strong equilibrium if and only if A satisﬁes (10)–(12) and (19).
Now consider T, an arbitrary mechanism as described in Remark 1. Suppose that A
is an equilibrium allocation under T. Then it satisﬁes (10)–(12). We can deﬁne strong
equilibrium as in Deﬁnition 2, so that the equilibrium is strong if and only if for all m,
v(m) is the maximum of W(.) (see (18)) over  (m), the set of admissible joint trades for
agents from the household with m when meeting regular agents. Letting
¯
 b(m)=f(0,0)g[f(q(m,1),l(m,1)g (20)
¯  s(m)=f(0,0)g[f(q,l):0l 1,B(q,l,1) B(q(1,m),l (1,m),1)g, (21)
we can set  (m) = [¯  b(m)
¯
 s(m)]I if p = 1 in stage 2 and  (m) = [
¯
 b(m) ¯  s(m)]I if
p = 0. (Here we may throw out some obviously dominated trades. In (20), a buyer in
state m obtains either no trade or the trade prescribed by A. In (21), a seller in state m
obtains either no trade or any trade giving a regular buyer a payoff no less than the trade
prescribed by A.) Although in general p matters, the next proposition gives conditions
independent of p to assure the equilibrium is strong.
Proposition 2. Let A be an allocation satisfying (C1) and (C2), and let the associ-
ated value function be strictly increasing and differentiable. Let the household be
large. If A satisﬁes (10)–(12), then for all m, v(m) = maxW((m)) subject to (m) 2
[¯  b(m) ¯  s(m)]I.
By this result, if the value function has the asserted properties then agents from the
largehouseholdwitharbitrarym donotjointlydeviate(intheequilibriumsupportingA
under T) even if they can choose joint trades from [¯  b(m) ¯  s(m)]I, so the equilibrium
is strong.
All proofs are in Appendix A. I sketch the proof of Proposition 2 to illustrate the roles
of the properties of the value function and the largeness of the household. I ﬁrst estab-
lish (i) B(q,l ,m) < B(q(m,1),l (m,1),m) for (q,l) 2 ¯  b(m)n
¯
 b(m), and (ii) S(q,l ,m) <
S(q(1,m),l (1,m),m) for (q,l) 2 ¯  s(m)n
¯
 s(m). Here I use the strict monotonicity of v.
Next, I show that g(m) is the household’s end-of-meeting holding implied by some op-
timal (m). With this result, I rule out all possible compositions of (m) that may lead
to W((m)) 6= v(m). A trick here is to combine the inequalities in (10), (11), (i), and (ii)
and cancel out the v terms. This trick uses the differentiability of v and the largeness of
the household, which imply v0(g(m)) is the only v term in those inequalities.
5. An approximation result
In this section, I take an -equilibrium approach to explore whether an equilibrium
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ﬁnite-household setting.11 Given the trading mechanism T A, I consider two notions of
-equilibrium when the household is ﬁnite.
Definition 3. An -equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle represented by f (see (1) and (2))
such that for one agent, the (expected lifetime) payoff from any sequence of his own
actions when meeting regular agents does not exceed by  the payoff from the sequence
of actions indicated by f , provided that all other agents, including those from the same
household, follow the actions indicated by f .12
Definition 4. A strengthened -equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle represented by f such
that for agents from the same household, the (expected lifetime) payoff from any se-
quence of their joint actions when meeting regular agents does not exceed by  the pay-
off from the sequence of joint actions indicated by f , provided that agents outside the
household follow the actions indicated by f .
In the rest of this section, I adopt the following notation. (a) The individual agent’s
payoff functions B in (5) andS in (7) are denoted Bn andSn, respectively. (b) The strat-
egy proﬁle f A in (13)–(15) withS =Sn is denoted f A














b, respectively. (d) The ﬁnite household’s payoff function W in (18) is denoted Wn.
(e) The large-household counterparts of the objects in (a)–(d) are denoted as before.
The next proposition gives the main result of this section.
Proposition 3. Let A be an allocation satisfying (C1) and (C2). Let M (the upper bound
on the household’s money holdings) be ﬁnite. Let >0.
(i) If f A is a Deﬁnition-1 equilibrium when the household is large, then there exists N
such that f A
n is a Deﬁnition-3 n 1-equilibrium when the household is ﬁnite and
n >N.
(ii) If f A is a Deﬁnition-2 strong equilibrium when the household is large, then there
exists N suchthat f A
n isaDeﬁnition-4strengthened -equilibriumwhenthehouse-
hold is ﬁnite and n >N.
In Proposition 3 (i), I am interested in n 1-equilibrium instead of -equilibrium
because when n increases, the measure of an agent in the household decreases, so that
in any pairwise meeting the payoff from any action of the agent decreases (see (4) and
(6)). The proof of Proposition 3 is built on the following lemma.
11Asanalternative,onemayaddressthisissuebystudyingwhetherthereexistsasequenceofequilibrium
allocations in the ﬁnite-household setting that converges (in some sense) to A as n !1. I do not have any
general result of this sort.
12Alternatively, in the deﬁnition one can let each sequence of the agent’s actions start in an arbitrary
meeting; that is, the meeting partner need not be a regular agent. Deﬁning an -equilibrium in this way
does not affect anything substantial.268 Tao Zhu Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Lemma 1. Let A be an allocation satisfying (C1) and (C2). Let the household be ﬁnite. Let
>0.
(i) If for all m, all (qb,lb)2 ¯  n




Bn(qb,lb,m)  Bn(q(m,1),l (m,1),m)<(1 ) (22)
Sn(qs,ls,m) Sn(q(1,m),l (1,m),m)<(1 ), (23)
then f A
n is a Deﬁnition-3 n 1-equilibrium.







n is a Deﬁnition-4 strengthened -equilibrium.
With the lemma in hand, the key to Proposition 3 (i) is the upper bound in (22). The
basic idea is as follows. For any ﬁxed m, when n is sufﬁciently large, any trade in ¯  n
b(m)
is not far away from some trades in ¯  b(m), and, therefore, if this upper bound is vio-
lated by (qb,lb), then from this (qb,lb) some value of (q,l) in ¯  b(m) with B(q,l,m) >
B(q(m,1),l(m,1),m) can be constructed. A similar idea works for the upper bound
in (24), the key to Proposition 3 (ii). The ﬁniteness of M in the proposition ensures
uniformity.
Lemma 1 still holds if ¯  n






s (m) is replaced by ¯  n
s (m).
By this result, we can adapt Proposition 3 to an arbitrary mechanism as described in
Remark 1 (refer to the discussion following Proposition 1).
6. Generalized Nash bargaining
We say that an allocation A = (q(.),l(.)) satisfying (C1) and (C2) is generated by general-
ized Nash bargaining if there exists some 2(0,1] such that for all (mb,ms),
(q(mb,ms),l(mb,ms))2argmax
(q,l)
[B(q,l ,mb)][S(q,l,ms)]1  subject to 0l mb. (25)
That is, if the buyer in state mb and the seller in state ms take the meeting-speciﬁc
Pareto frontier to be the one implied by the individual payoff functions B(.,mb) and
S(.,ms), then the trade (q(mb,ms),l(mb,ms)) is the Nash bargaining solution with  as
the buyer’s bargaining weight. If A satisﬁes (C1), (C2), and (25), then by Proposition 1,
f A is a Deﬁnition-1 equilibrium.13 In the rest of this section, I establish the existence of
such allocations.
13If  = 1, then A is also an equilibrium allocation when agents play the ultimatum game in pairwise
meetings (buyers make offers). If  < 1 and if one applies a suitable version of the Rubinstein–Ståhl
alternating-offer game in the meeting where the Pareto frontier is determined by B(.,mb) andS(.,ms), then
after taking the limit one obtains (q(mb,ms),l (mb,ms)) as the trading outcome.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Equilibrium concepts in the large-household model 269
First, I consider the large-household setting. If the transfer of money is l,





is the transfer of the good. This satisﬁes
u 0(y(l,!b,!s))[ y(l,!b,!s)+!sl ]=(1 )[u(y(l ,!b,!s)) !bl]. (26)
Iusethisfunctiony(.)toconstructtwoequilibriumallocationssatisfying(C1), (C2), and
(25). For the construction to go through, I need the following assumption:
(U) Either =1, or <1 and u 00u 00 u 0u 000.











The existence and uniqueness of y follow from (U).14 (Letting (!b,!s,l) = (!,!,1) in
(26) and comparing to (28), we see y(1,!,!)=y, which turns out to be the equilibrium
regular-meeting output.15) Let A be deﬁned by
q(mb,ms)=y(mb,!,!) and l(mb,ms)=mb. (29)
The value function associated with A in (29) is
v(m)=u(y(m,!,!)) y +(1 ) 1[u(y) y]. (30)
HereIalsoneedtheboundonthehousehold’smoneyholdingtosatisfyu 0(y(M,!,!))
1. The existence of such an M follows from u 0(y) 1 (implied by (27)) and the conti-
nuity of the mapping m !y(m,!,!).
Proposition 4. Suppose that (U) holds. Let M > 1 satisfy u 0(y(M,!,!))  1. Let the
household be large. Then the allocation A given by (29) satisﬁes (C1), (C2), and (25), and
f A is a Deﬁnition-2 strong equilibrium.
14Substituting ! in (28) into (27), we obtain [u 0+(1 )][u 0 +  1] = (1 )(u 00=u 0)(u  y).
Now notice that  +  1  0, that  (1 )u 00=u 0 is nondecreasing (implied by (U)), and that u is
strictly concave.
15In dealing with symmetric Nash bargaining ( = 0.5), Rauch (2000) provides a regular-meeting out-
put comparable to y0.5; see Section 6 for how Rauch obtains his result. Also, in a seemingly programmer-
automata setup, Shi (1999) provides a regular-meeting output comparable to y1; see Appendix B for how
Shi obtains his result.270 Tao Zhu Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
TheremarkablefeatureoftheProposition-4allocationisl(m,1)=m andl (1,m)=1
so that g(m) = 1 all m; that is, the household’s end-of-meeting money holding does
not depend on its pre-meeting holding. Consequently, the associated value function is
completely determined by its derivative at 1, v0(1). As shown in the proof, v0(1) = !=,
but ! is completely determined by (27) and (28) (which obviously do not depend on
v(.)), so my construction can go through. The restriction on M ensures that l(m,1)=m
holds for all m.
The Proposition-4 equilibrium resembles the equilibrium in the Lagos–Wright
model. In Lagos and Wright (2005), agents trade in a centralized market after random
matching, and preferences over centralized-trade goods are quasi-linear. For an inter-
nal solution in the centralized market, the agent must enter the centralized market with
money holdings that are not too large. In that case, the assumed quasi-linear pref-
erences imply that the value function for the agent’s end-of-meeting money holdings
is afﬁne, and that, in turn, implies that in a pairwise meeting, the buyer’s and seller’s
payoff functions are quasi-linear, linear in end-of-meeting holdings. Moreover, these
functions have the same linear coefﬁcient, provided that the sum of the buyer’s and
seller’s holdings is consistent with an internal solution in the centralized market. In the
Proposition-4 equilibrium, the buyer’s and seller’s payoffs are linear in each agent’s end-
of-meeting holdings (so the individual agent’s payoff functions are quasi-linear). The
upper bound on the household’s money holding ensures that all households have the
same end-of-meeting money holding, which in turn ensures that the linear coefﬁcients
regarding money for the buyer and seller in a meeting are identical. Finally, (U) has the
same uses in Lagos and Wright (2005) as it does here.
The second equilibrium in the large-household setting is not strong. Let ˜ y satisfy
u 0(˜ y)1 and
1=
u 0(˜ y)




u 0(˜ y)˜ y +(1 )u(˜ y)
u 0(˜ y)
. (32)
The existence and uniqueness of ˜ y again follow from (U). (Letting (!b,!s,l )=(0, ˜ !,1)
in (26) and comparing to (32), we see y(1,0, ˜ !) = ˜ y, which turns out to be the equilib-
rium regular-meeting output.) Let A be deﬁned by
q(mb,ms)=y(minfmb,1g,0, ˜ !) and l(mb,ms)=mb. (33)
The value function associated with A in (33) is
v(m)=u(y(minfm,1g,0, ˜ !))  ˜ y +(1 ) 1[u(˜ y)  ˜ y]. (34)
Proposition 5. Suppose that (U) holds. Let the household be large. Then the allocation
A given by (33) satisﬁes (C1), (C2), and (25) (but f A is not Deﬁnition-2 strong).
The value function associated with the Proposition-4 allocation is constant over
[1,M] (so v0
+(1) = 0). Here again g(m) = 1, so the value function is completely deter-
mined by v0
 (1). As shown in the proof, v0
 (1) = ˜ !=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by (31) and (32), so my construction can go through. The reason that the function v is
ﬂat is simple. Let m  1. Given that all buyers from the same household spend m, the
suitable value of v0
 (1) induces a seller in state m to acquire 1. Given that all sellers from
the same household acquire 1, v0
+(1) = 0 induces a buyer in state m to spend m, even
though spending m >1 gets the same amount of good as spending 1. In the equilibrium
f A, if all buyers from the household with m >1 offer (˜ y,1) to regular sellers and all sell-
ers from the household accept (˜ y,1) from regular buyers, then the household obtains a
higher payoff than it does by following f A. So this equilibrium is not strong.
Next I turn to two results for the ﬁnite-household setting. Both results can be ex-
tended to general bargaining powers; I restrict to  = 1 (the buyer has all bargaining
power) for the sake of simplicity.
Proposition 6. Let =1. Let the household be ﬁnite.
(i) If n > 1 and M > n=(n  1), then there exists an allocation A with l (1,1) = 1 satis-
fying (C1), (C2), and (25) (but f A is not Deﬁnition-2 strong).
(ii) If A with l (1,1)=1 satisﬁes (C1), (C2), and (25), then n >1.
The allocation in Proposition 6 (i) resembles the one in Proposition 5. In particular,
it has l(mb,ms) = mb and its associated value function is constant over [1,M]. (The
condition M > n=(n  1) ensures nonbindingness when M is ﬁnite.) Proposition 6 (ii)
says that n >1 is necessary for the existence of an equilibrium with the regular-meeting
transferofmoneyequaltoone,thetypeofequilibriuminPropositions4,5,and6(i). The
message is that the feasibility of degeneracy does not assure the existence of a certain
type of degenerate equilibrium.16
The proof of Proposition 6 (i) is not completely constructive, because now v0
 (1) is
notsufﬁcienttodeterminev(.). Iuseaﬁxed-pointargumenttodeterminev(.)over[0,1].
I have attempted to adapt this argument to establish a strong equilibrium allocation for
large n, but I have not been able to obtain a positive increment of v from 1 to some
z > 1. The key behind Proposition 6 (ii) is as follows. When n = 1, l(1,1) = 1 gives rise
to the dependence of the current payoff to agents in state m on the value function in
the form of v(m) = u(v(m)) for m in a neighborhood of 0, so v is a strictly concave
transformation of itself in the neighborhood. But this is impossible.
7. Comparison to the literature
As indicated above, aside from details, Shi (1997) and Rauch (2000) make all the im-
portant assumptions I make about the physical environment.17 They both consider
symmetric Nash bargaining ( = 0.5). Shi (1997), who initiated the use of the large-
household model for money applications, describes the household’s problem in terms
16Wallace and Zhu (2004, Section 2) deliver the same message in a standard single-agent household
model.
17Rauch (2000) and Shi (1997) also study an endogenous buyer–seller ratio and lump-sum money trans-
fers. I can extend the above formulations to these variants, but I can extend the above existence proof to
deal only with the variant with money transfers.272 Tao Zhu Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
of sequences of the household’s choices. In his formulation, each household takes as
given that the regular-meeting trade is the trade that its buyers and sellers will make—
independent of the household’s start-of-date money holding. However, such trade is
not feasible for a household with m <1, which leaves v(m) for m <1 undeﬁned. It also
implies that v(m) = v(1) for m  1. In a comment on Shi (1997), Rauch (2000) points
out the relevance of the household’s start-of-date holding. He proposes an alternative
formulation.
Following Shi (1997), Rauch describes the household problem in sequence form. He





where mt is the household’s money holding at the start of t, F(mt,!t) is the return to
the household from consumption and production at t, (mt,!t) is the net money in-
ﬂow to the household at t, and !t is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the con-
straintmt+1 =mt +(mt,!t).18 Notably,Rauchtreats!t asafunctionofmt (seeRauch
2000, (22) and (23)).19 This function cannot be arbitrary. It ought to be determined by
equilibrium conditions. But Rauch provides no such conditions, so his formulation is
incomplete.20
We can complete Rauch’s formulation by distinguishing the Lagrangian multipliers
in L from a function describing the individual agent’s marginal value of money. For
instance, let ^ !(.) be such a function so that if an agent’s household starts with m at t +1,





tfF(mt, ^ !(mt+1))+!t[mt+1  mt  (mt, ^ !(mt+1))]g. (35)
The maximum of the expected discounted utility for a household with m0 is v(m0) =
max ^ L(fmtg,f!tg) subject to (L) mt+1 2fx :x =mt +(mt, ^ !(x))g, all t. The constraint
(L) captures the loop described in the introduction. This constraint is nontrivial—given
^ !(.) and mt, the mapping x 7!mt +(mt, ^ !(x)) need not have a ﬁxed point.
Now the equilibrium condition is ^ !(.) = v0(.). The existence of an equilibrium
means the existence of such a ^ !(.), from which we can construct an equilibrium allo-
cation as follows. Fix m and set m0 = m in (35) and then set an optimal m1 to be g(m).
18This Lagrangian is recovered from Rauch (2000, (10)–(15) and (17)) in the case that the buyer’s ratio
is exogenous. Although fmtg is not included as a choice in Rauch (2000, (10)), it should be; otherwise,
when the buyer’s ratio is exogenous, the problem is absent choices, which is not the case according to the
context. By Rauch (2000, (1)), !t is taken by the individual agent as his marginal value of money in date-t
Nash bargaining; it affects F and  in the way given in Rauch (2000, (6) and (7)).
19Rauch (2000, (22) and (23)) ignores the effect of the change in mt on !t. As it turns out, this inconsis-
tency, among others, leads him to obtain a regular-meeting output comparable to y0.5 given by (27).
20Completeness cannot be obtained by assuming that !t is a free variable as in the usual Lagrangian
formulation, because here the period return F (also the money ﬂow ) depends on !t. For comparison,
think about the Lagrangian in the planner’s version of the growth model where the period return does not
depend on the multipliers.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Equilibrium concepts in the large-household model 273
Thenlet(q(mb,ms),l (mb,ms))2argmax[u(q)  ^ !(g(mb))l ][ q+ ^ !(g(ms))l ]subjectto




also be adapted to deal with the large ﬁrm’s decision problem in the labor search litera-
ture. Thelargeﬁrmhasmanyjobpositions,andthewageineachpositionisdetermined
by bargaining with a worker. But in the literature, the ﬁrm takes the prevailing wage as
given (see Pissarides 2000, Ch. 3.1). This treatment seems problematic, and it actually
inﬂuences the initial formulation of the large-household model in monetary economics
(see the discussion in Shi 1998, p. 327). Following the approach used above, it could be
assumed that the wage in each position is determined by bargaining between a ﬁrm’s
agent and a worker, while taking as given the bargaining outcome between other agents
of the ﬁrm and workers.
Appendix
A. Proofs










s =1. Fixm. Bytheconcavityofu andv andJensen’sinequal-


















b) = (q(m,1),l(m,1)) and (q
s,l 
s ) = (q(1,m),l(1,m)). So if v(m) is the max-
imum of w(.) over   K, then v(m) is the maximum of W(.) over [¯  b(m)  ¯  s(m)]I.
Denote by (¯ ,qb,lb,qs,ls) a maximizer of w(.) with ¯  = (¯ b, ¯ 
b, ¯ 0
b, ¯ s, ¯ 
s, ¯ 0
s). Now it
sufﬁces to show ¯ 
b = ¯ 
s = 1, which clearly implies w(¯ ,qb,lb,qs,ls) = v(m). I ﬁrst es-
tablish some intermediate results, mainly properties of ¯ . In what follows, let ^ w() 





Claim 1. (i) B(qb,lb,m) < B(q
b,l 
b,m); (ii) if ¯ b > 0, then lb 6= l 
b; (iii) S(qs,ls,m) <
S(q
s,l 
s ,m); and (iv) if ¯ s >0 then ls 6=l 
s .





b,m). By the strict monotonicity of v and g(m) < M, v0(g(m)) >
0. So it must be that qb 6= q
band lb 6= l 
b. But then any interior linear combination
of (qb,lb) and (q
b,l 
b), denoted (q,l), satisﬁes B(q,l,m) > B(q
b,l 
b,m) and S(q,l ,1) 
S(q
b,l 
b,1) (recall that u is strictly concave), contradicting (12). For part (ii), suppose
lb =l 
b. Then part (i) implies u(qb)<u(q
b), so that (¯ ,qb,lb,qs,ls) is not a maximizer of
w(.). Analogously, we can establish parts (iii) and (iv). Ã274 Tao Zhu Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Next, without loss of generality, we can assume (A1) if l 
b = 0 then ¯ 0
b = 0, (A2) if
l 
s =0 then ¯ 0
s =0, (A3) if ¯ 0
b >0 then h(¯ ) g(m), and (A4) if ¯ 0
s >0 then h(¯ ) g(m).
For (A1), suppose ¯ 0
b >0. Then ^ w(¯ )= ^ w(), where =(¯ b, ¯ 
b + ¯ 0
b,0, ¯ s, ¯ 
s, ¯ 0
s), so




s + ¯ 0
s,0). For (A3), suppose h(¯ ) > g(m). Then by (10) and the concavity of v,
d ^ w((x))=dx  0 at h((x))  g(m), where (x) = (¯ b, ¯ 
b +x, ¯ 0
b  x, ¯ s, ¯ 
s, ¯ 0
s), so we
can replace ¯  by the (x) for which h((x)) = g(m). Analogously, we can justify (A4);
now use (11) and (x)=(¯ b, ¯ 
b, ¯ 0
b, ¯ s, ¯ 
s +x, ¯ 0
s  x).
Claim 2. (i) If lb < l 
b and ¯ b > 0 then h(¯ )  g(m); (ii) if lb > l 
b and ¯ b > 0 then
h(¯ )  g(m); (iii) if ls > l 
s and ¯ s > 0 then h(¯ )  g(m); and (iv) if ls < l 
s and ¯ s > 0
then h(¯ ) g(m).
Proof. For part (i), suppose h(¯ ) > g(m). But then by Claim 1 (i) and the concavity of
v, d ^ w((x))=dx > 0 at h((x)) > g(m), where (x) = (¯ b  x, ¯ 
b +x, ¯ 0
b, ¯ s, ¯ 
s, ¯ 0
s). The
same argument rules out h() < g(m) in part (ii). Analogously, we can establish parts
(iii) and (iv); now use Claim 1 (iii) and (x)=(¯ b, ¯ 
b, ¯ 0
b, ¯ s  x, ¯ 
s +x, ¯ 0
s). Ã
Claim 3. h(¯ )= g(m).
Proof. First suppose h(¯ ) < g(m). Then by (A4), ¯ 0
s = 0; by Claim 1 (ii) and Claim 2
(ii), if ¯ b >0 then lb <l 
b; by Claim 1 (iv) and Claim 2 (iv), if ¯ s >0 then ls >l 
s . But then
it must be h(¯ ) g(m), a contradiction. Analogously, we can rule out h(¯ )> g(m); now
use (A3), Claim 1 (ii), Claim 2 (i), Claim 1 (iv), and Claim 2 (iii). Ã
Next, without loss of generality, we can assume (A5) ¯ 0
b ¯ 0
s =0.
For (A5), suppose ¯ 0
b ¯ 0
s > 0. Then ﬁrst by (A1) and (A2), l 
bl 
s > 0. Then by
Claim 3, (10), and (11), d ^ w((x))=dx  0, where (x) = (¯ b, ¯ 
b + xl 
s , ¯ 0
b   xl 





b) (note that h((x))= g(m)), so we can replace ¯  by the (x) for which
x =minf¯ 0
b=l 
s , ¯ 0
s=l 
bg.
Claim 4. (i) If ¯ b ¯ s >0 then (lb  l 
b)(ls  l 
s )<0; (ii) if ¯ 0
b ¯ b >0 then lb <l 
b; and (iii) if
¯ 0
s ¯ s >0 then ls <l 
s .
Proof. For part (i), suppose (lb  l 
b)(ls  l 
s ) > 0. But then by Claim 3 and Claim 1 (i)
and (iii), d ^ w((x))=dx > 0, where (x) = (¯ b  x, ¯ 
b +x, ¯ 0
b, ¯ s  x, ¯ 
s +x, ¯ 0
s) with
 = (lb  l 
b)=(ls  l 
s ) (note h((x)) = g(m)). For part (ii), ﬁrst by Claim 1 (ii), lb 6= l 
b.
Suppose lb > l 





b=lb x, ¯ s, ¯ 
s, ¯ 0
s)(noteh((x))= g(m)). Analogously,
we can establish part (iii); now use Claim 1 (iv), Claim 3, (11), Claim 1 (iii), and (x) =
(¯ b, ¯ 
b, ¯ 0
b, ¯ s  xl 
s =ls, ¯ 
s +x, ¯ 0
s +xl 
s =ls  x). Ã
Finally, I show ¯ 
b = ¯ 
s =1 by ruling out the following three cases.
(a) ¯ 0
b = ¯ 0
s =0and ¯ b+ ¯ s >0. If ¯ b ¯ s =0thenh(¯ )= g(m)cannothold. If ¯ b ¯ s >0,
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(b) ¯ 0
b >0. By(A5), ¯ 0
s =0. If ¯ b+ ¯ s =0,thenh(¯ )= g(m)cannothold. If ¯ b >0,then
by Claim 4 (ii), lb < l 
b so h(¯ ) = g(m) can hold only if ¯ s > 0 and ls < l 
s , which
contradicts Claim 4 (i). So the remaining possibility is ¯ b = 0 and ¯ s > 0. Now
h(¯ )= g(m)onlyifls <l 
s . Butthenby(10),Claim1(iii),and(A1),d ^ w((x))=dx >
0, where (x) = (¯ b, ¯ 
b + x(l 
s   ls), ¯ 0
b   x(l 
s   ls), ¯ s   xl 
b, ¯ 





s >0. Wecanruleoutthiscaseanalogouslytocase(b); hereuse(A5),Claim4(iii)
and (i), (11), Claim 1 (i), (A2), and (x)=(¯ b  xl 
s , ¯ 
b +xl 
s , ¯ 0






Proof of Lemma 1. For part (i), let vb
n(m) be the supremum of the (expected lifetime)
payoffs to the buyer from sequences of his actions starting from a date when his house-
hold holds m, provided that all other agents follow f A. Note that the function vb
n :
[0,M] ! R is bounded above (recall that u and v are bounded). Without loss of gen-
erality we can assume that vb






where (qb,lb)2 ¯  n
b(m) is the buyer’s present-date trade in meeting a regular seller, m+ is
the implied household’s end-of-meeting holding (i.e., m+ = g(m)+l(m,1)n 1 lbn 1),
and the inequality follows from the hypothesis. Iterating this and using the bounded-
ness of vb
n, we obtain vb
n(m) v(m)<n 1, as desired. If the agent concerned is a seller,
we deﬁne vs
n analogously and by a similar argument obtain vs
n(m) v(m)<n 1.
For part (ii), let vh
n(m) be the (expected lifetime) payoffs to the household from se-
quencesofjointactionsofthehouseholdmembersstartingfromadatewhenthehouse-
hold holds m, provided that all agents outside the household follow f A. Note that the
function vh
n : [0,M] ! R is bounded above. Without loss of generality, we can assume
that vh










s (m)]I is the household’s present-date trades in meeting reg-
ular agents, m+ is the implied household’s end-of-meeting holding, and the inequality
follows from the hypothesis. Iterating this and using the boundedness of vh
n, we obtain
vh
n(m) v(m)<, as desired. 
Proof of Proposition 3. First let A satisfy (C1) and (C2) and let M be ﬁnite.








Claim 2. For all m, Sn(q,l ,m) Sn(q
s,l 
s ,m) S(q,l ,m) S(q
s,l 
s ,m), where (q
s,l 
s ) 
(q(1,m),l (1,m));276 Tao Zhu Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Claim 3. For all  > 0, there exists N such that for all n > N, m 2 [0,M], q  0,
and l 2 [0,m], Sn(q,l ,1)   Sn(q
b,l 
b,1) < S(q,l ,1)   S(q
b,l 




To see these claims, by the concavity of v and the deﬁnitions of v0
+ and v0
 , we have
(i) 8z  0, if  > 0 then v0
+(z)  [v(z +) v(z)] 1; (ii) 8z > 0, if  2 (0,z] then [v(z) 
v(z  )] 1  v0
 (z); and (iii) 8 > 0, 9 < 1 such that 8 2 (0,), v0
+(1) < [v(1+) 
v(1)] 1+ and v0
 (1)>[v(1) v(1 )] 1 . Applying (i) and (ii) to (5), (7), (8), and
(9), we obtain Claims 1 and 2; applying (i)–(iii) to (7) and (9), we obtain Claim 3. Here
note that n[v(z +n 1) v(z)] = [v(z +) v(z)] 1 for  = n 1. For Claim 3, we go
through all six ordering relationships among l, l (1,1), and l 
b, and use v(z2) v(z1) =
[v(z2) v(1)]+[v(1) v(z1)].
Next let (10)–(12) hold for the large household. By (11) and (C1), v0
 (1)>0. Fix >0.
Let ¯   (1 ). Let y, > 0 satisfy (a1) y = v0
+(1) if v0
+(1) > 0 and y = v0
 (1) if
v0
+(1) = 0, (a2) 2u(y) < ¯ , and (a3) 2[v() v(0)] < ¯ . Fix N such that 8n > N Claim




s ) be as given above.
For q  0, l 2 [0,m], and  = (b,
b,
s) 2 R3
+ with b + 
b  1 and 










For part (i) of the proposition, ﬁx (qb,lb) 2 ¯  n
b(m) and (qs,ls) 2
¯
 n
s (m). It sufﬁces
to show that (22) and (23) hold. For (23), suppose to the contrary that Sn(qs,ls,m)  
Sn(q
s,l 
s ,m)  ¯ , so (qs,ls) cannot be (q
s,l 
s ) and must be (0,0). But then setting (q,l) =
(0,0) in Claim 2 gives S(0,0,m)  S(q
s,l 
s ,m)  ¯ , which contradicts (11) (for the large
household). For (22), suppose to the contrary that  Bn(qb,lb,m)  Bn(q
b,l 
b,m) ¯ .
Again (qb,lb) can neither be (q
b,l 





b(m), which implies Sn(qb,lb,1)  Sn(q
b,l 
b,1); then by Claim 3, S(qb,lb,1)+
y > S(q
b,l 
b,1)  S. By   ¯ , setting (q,l) = (qb,lb) in Claim 1 gives B(qb,lb,m)  
B(q
b,l 
b,m)  ¯ , so by (10), u(qb)  ¯ . By (a2) (and concavity of u and u(0) = 0),
B(qb,lb,m)  B(qb  y,lb,m) < ¯ =2, so B(qb  y,lb,m) > B(q
b,l 
b,m). But this con-
tradicts (12) becauseS(qb  y,lb,1) S(qb,lb,1)=y so thatS(qb  y,lb,1)>S.





s (m)]I. Itsufﬁcestoshow(24)holds. SupposetothecontrarythatWn((m)) 




b(m) such that w(,qb,lb) 
Wn((m)). So w(,q,l )  v(m)+ ¯ , and note as above that S(qb,lb,1)+y > S. First
suppose qb  q
b >y. By (a2), w(,qb  y,lb)>v(m). But this contradicts (19) because
S(qb   y,lb,1) > S. So it must be that qb  q
b  y. Next suppose   [ws(l 
b,1)  
ws(lb,1)] > y (see (9)). Let [ws(l ,1) ws(lb,1)] = y. By (a1), l  lb  ; then by (a3),
w(,qb,l ) > v(m). But this contradicts (19) because S(qb,l ,1) > S. So it must be that
 y. Next suppose l 
b  lb >. Then q
b qb. Given  y, l 
b  lb > and (a1) imply
v0
+(1)=0 and l 
b >l(1,1), so that (q
b,l (1,1))2 b(m). It follows that g(m)1 andq
s =0;
otherwise, the large household with m has obvious beneﬁcial joint deviations (recall
that v0
 (1) > 0). But then w(,qb,lb) cannot exceed v(m), a contradiction. So it must
be that l 
b  lb  . But this, qb  q
b  y, (a2), and (a3) imply w(,qb,lb) < v(m)+ ¯ , a
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Proof of Proposition 4. First I claim that u(y(m,!,!)) is strictly increasing and con-
cave and differentiable in m, and v0(1) = !. To see this, set !b = !s = ! in (26).
It is clear that l 7! y(l,!,!) is strictly increasing and so is l 7! u(y(l,!,!)). By the
implicit function theorem, l 7! y(l,!,!) is continuously differentiable and so is l 7!
u(y(l,!,!)). Differentiating (26) with respect to l at (!b,!s) = (!,!) and substitut-
ing  y(l,!,!)+!l =(1 )[u(y(l ,!,!)) !l]=[u 0(y(l,!,!))] (which is obtained by
rewriting (26) with (!b,!s)=(!,!)), we have
y 0(l ,!,!)=
u 0(y)!+(1 )!
u 0(y) (1 )u 00(y)[u(y) !l]=u 0(y)
, (36)
where y 0(l,!,!) denotes the derivative of y(.) with respect to its ﬁrst argument and y =
y(l,!,!). By (36) and (U), some algebra conﬁrms u 00y 0 +u 0y 00  0, so l 7! u(y(l,!,!))
is concave. By (30), v0(1) = u 0(y(1,!,!))y 0(1,!,!). Using this and (36) with l = 1
and (27), we have v0(1) = ! (recall y = y(1,!,!)). Next, by y > 0 and the above
claim, A in (29) satisﬁes (C1) and (C2). Note that g(mb) = g(ms) = 1. Substituting this
and v0(1) = ! into (25) and referring to (8) and (9), we see that A satisﬁes (25) if and
only if (i) u 0(q(mb,ms))[ q(mb,ms) + !mb] = (1   )[u(q(mb,ms))   !mb] and (ii)
u 0(q(mb,ms))  1. But (i) follows from (26) and (ii) from u 0(y(M,!,!))  1. Finally, by
Propositions 1 and 2 and the claim, f A is a strong equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 5. First I claim that u(y(m,0, ˜ !)) is continuous, concave, and
strictly increasing in m, v0
 (1) = ˜ !, and v0
+(1) = 0. The continuity, monotonicity, and
fact that v0
+(1) = 0 are obvious. Differentiating (26) with respect to l at (!b,!s) = (0, ˜ !)
andsubstituting y(l,0, ˜ !)+ ˜ !l =(1 )u(y(l,0, ˜ !))=[u 0(y(l ,0, ˜ !))](whichisobtained
by rewriting (26) with (!b,!s)=(0, ˜ !)), we have
y 0(l,0, ˜ !)=
u 0(y) ˜ !
u 0(y) (1 )u 00(y)u(y)=u 0(y)
, (37)
where y 0(l,0, ˜ !) denotes the derivative of y(.) with respect to its ﬁrst argument and y =
y(l,0, ˜ !). By (37) and (U), some algebra conﬁrms u 00y 0 +u 0y 00  0 so l 7! u(y(l,0, ˜ !)) is
concave. By (34), v0
 (1)=u 0(y(1,0, ˜ !))y 0(1,0, ˜ !). Using this, (37) with l =1, and (31), we
have v0
 (1) = ˜ ! (recall ˜ y = y(1,0, ˜ !)). Next, by ˜ y > 0 and the above claim, A in (33)
satisﬁes (C1) and (C2). Note that g(mb) = g(ms) = 1. Substituting this, v0
 (1) = ˜ !, and
v0
+(1) = 0 into (25) and referring to (8) and (9), we see that A satisﬁes (25) if and only
if u 0(q(mb,ms))[ q(mb,ms)+ ˜ !mb] = (1 )u(q(mb,ms)). But the equality follows
from (26). 
Proof of Proposition 6. When the household is ﬁnite, A satisﬁes (25) with =1 (refer









 (g(mb)+l(mb,1)n 1  l (mb,ms)n 1)]. (40)278 Tao Zhu Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Also notice that g(1)=1, which is used frequently below.
Now I prove part (i) of the proposition. Let  satisfy u() < , and let V be the
set of functions  : [0,M] ! R that are continuous, nondecreasing, concave, and satisfy
(1) (0)  . Let K = [1 n 1,1] and let W be the set of functions w : K ! R with
w = on K for some  2V. For w 2W and m 2[0,1], let
y(m,w)=n[w(1 n 1 +mn 1) w(1 n 1)]. (41)
Then letGw : K !R be deﬁned by
Gw(m)=u(y(m,w)) y(1,w)+w(1). (42)
Suppose that w is a ﬁxed point ofG with y(1,w)>0. Let the allocation A be deﬁned
by
q(mb,ms)=y(minfmb,1g,w), l(mb,ms)=mb.
The value function associated with this A is
v(m)=u(y(minfm,1g,w)) y(1,w)+w(1). (43)
Note that by w = Gw, v = w on K. Clearly A satisﬁes (C1) and (C2). Substituting
g(mb) = g(ms) = 1 and v0
+(1) = 0 (all implied by this A) into (38)–(40), we immediately
see that A satisﬁes (38)–(40). It is also easy to verify that f A is not a Deﬁnition-2 strong
equilibrium.
It remains to ﬁnd a ﬁxed point ofG with y(1,w) > 0. To this end, let W be equipped
with the sup norm topology. I claim (i) W is compact and convex and (ii) GW  W. For




w. It is obvious thatGw is nondecreasing, continuous and concave. For this w, let v be
deﬁned by (43). It is obvious that v =Gw on K and that v 2 V if v(1) v(0)  . But by
y(1,w)n[w(1) w(1 n 1)] and y(0,w)0, we have v(1) v(0)u()<.
Because W is compact, y(.,.) is uniformly continuous on [0,1]W and so wj ! w
implies y(.,wj) ! y(.,w) uniformly, that is, G : W!W is continuous. To rule out the
trivial ﬁxed point ofG (the zero function), I introduce a sequence of auxiliary mappings.
Speciﬁcally, deﬁne w i : K ! R by w i(m) = w(m) + m=i. Then let Giw : K ! R be
deﬁned by Giw(m) = Gw i(m). Choose a sufﬁciently large integer i so that 8w 2 W,
Giw 2 W. Because Gi is continuous, by Sauder’s ﬁxed point theorem, it has a ﬁxed
point wi; that is, wi = Giwi = Gw i
i . Because W is compact, the sequence fwig has a
convergent subsequence. To simplify the notation, denote this subsequence by fwig
and let w be its limit point. Because w is also the limit point of fw i
i g and G is contin-
uous and wi =Gw i
i , it follows that w is a ﬁxed point of G. Because w i
i is concave and
strictly increasing, it follows that wi = Gw i
i is concave and nondecreasing, and hence
that w 0
i (1) is deﬁned and nonnegative. It follows fromGw i
i =wi and (41) and (42) that
w 0
i (1) = u 0(y(1,w i
i ))[w 0
i (1)+1=i], which implies y(1,w i
i )  y1 (y1 is deﬁned by (27)Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Equilibrium concepts in the large-household model 279
and note that u 0(y1) = 1). By the continuity of y(1,.), y(1,w)  y1. (It can actually be
shown that y(1,w)=y1.)
Next I prove part (ii) of the proposition. Suppose that A satisﬁes the hypotheses but
n =1. Setting (mb,ms)=(1,1) in (38) and using l(1,1)=1 andq(1,1)>0, we have v(1)>
v(0). So by the continuity and concavity of v, v is strictly increasing in a neighborhood
of0. Bycontinuity,wecanﬁnd ¯ m 2(0,1)closeto0sothatv( ¯ m)isclosetov(0)and8m 2
[0, ¯ m],q(m,1)iscloseto0(againuse(38)andnotethatl(m,1)m)andu 0(q(m,1))>1.
Let z  minfm : v(m) = v(1)g. First consider z  1. I claim that 8m 2 [0, ¯ m], m =
l (m,1) and l(1,m) = 1 so that g(m) = 1. By this claim and (38) and l(1,1) = 1, q(m,1) =
v(m) v(0) andq(1,m)=v(1) v(0), so that v(m)=u(q(m,1))+v(0). Then by
q(0,1)=0andu(0)=0,wehavev(0)=0,sothatv(m)=u(q(m,1))orv(m)=u(v(m)).
But this cannot hold for all m 2[0, ¯ m], because u is strictly concave and v is concave.
To see the claim, ﬁx m 2 [0, ¯ m]. First suppose l (1,m) < 1. Setting (mb,ms) = (1,m)




Setting (mb,ms) = (1,1) in (39) gives u 0(q(1,1))v0
 (1)  v0
+(1). Comparing this with
(44) and using l (1,m) < 1 and q(1,m) < q(1,1) (implied by (38) and l (1,m) < l (1,1)),
we have g(m)  1 so l(m,1) < m. Then setting (mb,ms) = (m,1) in (40) gives
u 0(q(m,1))v0
+(l(m,1))  v0
 (g(m)), which by u 0(q(m,1)) > 1 implies l (m,1)  g(m),
contradicting g(m)  1 because l(m,1) < m  ¯ m < 1. So l (1,m) = 1. Now suppose
l (m,1) < m. Then again u 0(q(m,1))v0
+(l (m,1))  v0
 (g(m)) so l(m,1)  g(m). Given
l (1,m)=1, l(m,1)<m implies g(m)>1, contradicting l (m,1) g(m) because m <1.
In case z < 1, v0
+(z) = 0. Using this and by an argument similar to the one estab-
lishing the above claim, we can verify that 8m 2 [0, ¯ m], l(m,1) = m and l(1,m) 2 [z,1],
which again imply v(m)=u(v(m)). 
B. The programmer-automata interpretation
Here I study the physical environment in Section 2. But now I consider the automata
notion of the household (see the introduction). As indicated above, this seems to be
the notion used in Shi (1999) and most of the recent literature. This literature speciﬁ-
cally assumes that the household gives an order to each agent regarding what to do in
a meeting. Following this literature, I restrict attention to the ultimatum game (buyers
make offers) in pairwise meetings.
First I describe the automata game. In a generic household, the programmer at the
start of a date chooses for each buyer an offering program and for each seller a respond-
ing program. A generic offering program is a pair of real-valued functions (q(.),l(.)) on
[0,M]2. A generic responding program is a function (.) from [0,M]2 R2
+ to f0,1g. To
see how the programs work, consider a meeting between a buyer from a household
whose start-of-date money holding is mb and a seller from a household whose start-
of-date money holding is ms. Let (q(.),l (.)) be the offering program carried by the buyer
and let (.) be the responding program carried by the seller. Then the buyer’s offer is280 Tao Zhu Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
(q(mb,ms),l(mb,ms)). If 0l(mb,ms)mb and (mb,ms,(q(mb,ms),l(mb,ms))=1,
then this offer is carried out; otherwise, there is no trade.
I restrict attention to equilibria such that all buyers/sellers (from all households) are
given the same offering/responding program forever. So an equilibrium is an offering
program and a responding program such that it is optimal for a programmer to choose
these programs currently and in future, provided that all other programmers choose
these programs. Any equilibrium is degenerate in the same sense as in the main text.
Now let the household be large. I show that there exist a continuum of equilibria.
Let y1 be the one given by (27) and let M > 1 satisfy u 0(My1)  1. Fix y 2 (0,y1]. Let
(q(mb,ms),l(mb,ms)) = (mby,mb), for all (mb,ms). Let (q,l,mb,ms) = 1 if and only
if q  l y and 0  l  mb, for all (mb,ms). If all programmers choose (q(.),l(.)) and
(.), then the value function deﬁned on the household’s money holdings is the unique
continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly concave function satisfying v(m)=u(my) 
y +v(1). By u 0(My)1, this v also satisﬁes
v(m)= max
0lm,01
u(l y) y +v(m + l). (45)
By (45), one programmer cannot gain from any deviation if the other programmers
choose (q(.),l (.)) and (.). So (q(.),l (.)) and (.) constitute an equilibrium. In this equi-
librium, (y,1) is the regular-meeting trade (in the same sense as in the main text), and
the value function for the household’s money holdings is concave.
In contrast, with the team notion, if A with l (1,1) = 1 is an equilibrium allocation
generated by the ultimatum game and its associated value function is concave, then it
can be shown that the regular-meeting output must be y1. Shi (1999) formulates a value
function v comparable to the one in (45). He argues that the buyer is able to extract all
trade surplus, so the regular-meeting output y must be v0(1), which, in turn, implies
y = y1. With the automata notion, this argument is not valid. Now the split-the-surplus
game is a simultaneous-move game between programmers, who choose programs for
the buyer and seller, so the buyer, or more accurately, his programmer, may not be able
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